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Abstract
Recent volatility in real exchange rates has renewed interest in the nature ofmultinational firms.
One increasingly common phenomenon involves the foreign sourcing of production, in which certain
domestic firms choose to producepart or all oftheirproduct abroad and then export the commodity for
domestic sale. Multinational production has been rationalized on the basis of inherent asymmetries
betweenfinns, such as the possession ofcertain firm-specific assets or differences between firms in their
perceptions offoreign productioncosts, access to foreign subsidy programs, and the possibility oftariff
preemption. Such behavior has also been rationalized in terms of corporate risk-aversion and a desire
to hedge real exchange rate risk through the diversification ofproductionlocations.
This paper presents an entirely novel explanation forthe existence ofmultinational firms and the
foreign sourcing ofproduction. Rather than relying on exogenous asymmetries between firms or on
assumptions about corporate aversion to risk, this explanationrecognizes that exchange rate uncertainty
may offer apurely strategic motive for symmetric and risk-neutral domestic oligopolists to precommit
to foreign production in order to attain a position ofindustry leadership. This explanation is presented
in the specific context of a two-period model ofstrategic foreign production by domestic duopolists.
Strategically symmetric and risk-neutral firms are confronted by a unique source ofuncertainty in the
form ofa randomly fluctuating exchange rate. Exchange rate uncertainty is resolved, for the purposes
ofcurrent production production decisions, betweenthe two periods. Precommitted foreign production
in the first period yields a leadership advantage relative to firms that do not precommit, but this decision
must be evaluated against the value ofthe alternative ofremaining flexible to adopt a production plan
afterthe resolution ofexchange rateuncertainty. A unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in mixed
strategies is determined in this market, allowing a Stackelberg leader to endogenously emerge through
a credible precommitment to the foreign sourcing ofproduction.
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Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis University ofBritish Columbia
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The dramatic increase in exchange rate volatility during the last decade has focussed atten-
tion on the influence of random exchange rate fluctuations on corporate behavior in concentrated
industries. One aspect of this influence concerns the observation that leading firms in such indus-
tries frequently tend to be multinational in character, while their rivals remain purely domestic.
Another aspect concerns the increasingly common phenomenon of foreign sourcing of production
by domestic firms, in which dominant firms in one economy frequently choose to produce part or
all of their product abroad and then export the commodity to their home economy for domestic
sale. 1
Several rationales for multinationalism and the foreign sourcing of production among industry
leaders have appeared in both academic journals and the business press. The most obvious expla-
nation for foreign production sourcing involves the opportunity for cheap production abroad as a
result of a belief in the persistant strength of domestic currency. The emergence of certain firms
as multinationals can subsequently be explained through the presence of some inherent asymmetry
between rival firms in an industry. The possession by one firm of some internal advantage, such
as proprietary knowledge from research expenditures or superior management and marketing tech-
niques, could yield a substantial cost advantage over both foreign and domestic rivals and allow
it to become an industry leader. Other asymmetries between firms which could induce multina-
tional production include differential access to foreign subsidy programs, imperfect domestic capital
markets, or the desire by certain domestic firms to secure access to a foreign economy, under the
expectation of future trade barriers, for eventual sales in the foreign market. Yet another explana-
tion for multinationalism and the foreign sourcing of production involves the hedging of exchange
rate risk through the diversification of production locations. While all of these explanations are
plausible, each relies, in some measure, on either the exogenous existence of explicit or implicit
asymmetries between rival firms in an industry, or on a corporate aversion to risk and associated
imperfections in domestic and international capital markets.
When the industry producing for the domestic market is concentrated, Lowever, multinational
production may arise among completely symmetric, risk-n emitral firms and may underlie the endoge-
nous emergence of industry leadership. Foreign production sourcing can occur jrecisely because
1 Examples of this latter phenomenon include American firms, such as Apple, choosing to produce some lines of personal
computers in Taiwan for sale in the US, or Japanese firms, such as Honda, producing automobiles in the US for ultimate
sale in Japan.
2uncertainty over real exchange rates offers a purely strategic motive for initially symmetric, risk-
neutral domestic oligopolists to precommit to foreign production for domestic sale. A decision to
incur a fixed investment cost and credibly commit to foreign production in advance may, as a result
ofrandom exchange rate fluctuations, offer a domestic firm a lower marginal cost of production and
the opportunity to obtain the increased expected profits associated with being a Stackelberg leader
in the domestic market. This advantage of precommitment, however, must be weighed against the
opportunity cost ofprecommitment, which involves surrendering the option to remain flexible under
such uncertainty and to select a production location and production volume after the resolution of
that portion of exchange rate uncertainty which is relevant for current production and investment
decisions.
Our objective in this paper is to proffer this new explanation of multinational production. We
examine the role of exchange rate randomness in creating endogenous industry leadership, through
strategic precommitment to multinational production, in the context of a symmetric duopoly with
risk-neutral firms. We analyze a stylized model of an industry in which each firm can produce its
commodity domestically, under certain demand and cost conditions, or, by incurring a fixed cost,
credibly precommit to foreign production and domestic sale under cost uncertainty induced by a
random real exchange rate. When decisions concerning production volume and location are made
simultaneously, a domestic firm must assess the tradeoff between precommitting to a volume of
foreign production under uncertainty and possibly obtaining the position of a Stackelberg leader in
the industry, or remaining flexible and waiting until short-run exchange rate uncertainty is resolved
to make its decision about production location, at the cost of possibly becoming a follower to its
rival in the industry.
The optimal precommitment decision under exchange rate uncertainty is characterized by a
unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies with respect to the timing of the
selection of production location by the symmetric domestic duopolists in our model. When the
fixed cost of exercising the option to engage in foreign production is small relative to the expected
cost advantage of foreign production created by the randomly fluctuating exchange rate, each firm
will select a positive probability of foreign production sourcing, thereby obtaining the leadership
advantage of precommitment, but, as long as there is some uncertainty about the exchange rate,
both firms will not, with certainty, exercise their option to produce abroad. Such randomization in
the timing of the production location decision implies that exchange rate uncertainty can induce
3multinational production, even among firms that are entirely risk-neutral and display an initial
symmetry, and that foreign production is, for purely strategic reasons, quite naturally associated
with the endogenous emergence of industry leadership.
While this paper considers a novel source of influence of exchange rate uncertainty on strategic
and irreversible decisions about the foreign sourcing of production, it is related to earlier litera-
ture concerning the existence of multinational firms and also to recent literature examining the
implications of precommitment and irreversibility for domestic market structure.
Several theories rationalize the existence of multinational firms in a deterministic economy.
These include the industrial organization theory of direct foreign investment, most notably asso-
ciated with Caves (1971) and Hymer (1976), in which firms in oligopolistic industries are argued
to possess intangible, firm-specific assets, such as management and marketing techniques and pro-
prietary knowledge from research expenditure, which give them an advantage over rivals in foreign
markets; the eclectic theory of Dunning (1973), (1977), in which it is argued that some firms pos-
sess unique firm-specific assets which can be fully utilized only through combination with factor
inputs specific to a foreign economy; and the internalization theory, primarily owing to the work of
Rugman (1980), (1981), (1986), in which reputational effects and other considerations can create
advantages for the creation of foreign subsidiaries by a domestic firm, relative to its licensing the
production of its commodity by autonomous foreign firms. Each of these theories reflect a com-
mon assumption that multinational firms emerge from the asymmetric possession by some firms of
unique nonmarketable assets. These assets have a public-good component, which induces multi-
plant scale economies, giving those firms which possess them a potential cost advantage over both
foreign and domestic rivals and, in the presence of tariffs or international transportation costs,
an obvious incentive to engage in direct foreign investment. Grosse (1985) provides an early de-
scription of some game-theoretic aspects of multinational production and sales, while Buckley and
Casson (1981), Helpman (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1988)
and Butler (1989) provide rigorous models of the incentives created for foreign direct investment
by the possession of firm-specific assets.
An alternative explanation for the practice of foreign production sourcing, offered by Hodder
and Jucker (1985), Shapiro (1987), and others, relies directly on the presence~ofrandomness in
(real) exchange rates. Firms which exhibit risk-averse behavior may choose to diversify their
production between foreign and domestic locations in order to hedge against exchange rate risk. The
4veracity of this explanation, of course, relies on a fundamental inability of individual equityholders
to fully diversify their own portfolios, requiring firms in which they hold equity to also provide
intermediation services, as well as an inability of such firms to hedge against exchange rate risk
through international capital markets.
The strategic role of precommnitment through irreversible investments in a purely domestic
context has also been extensively studied, most notably by Eaton and Lipsey (1979), (1980) and
by Dixit (1980), in the context of deterministic two period games. More complex game-theoretic
models, which use first-period cost or demand uncertainty to study the trade-off between the
advantages of irreversible precommitment and the advantages of remaining flexible and delaying
irreversible decisions until the resolution ofuncertainty, have been studied in Gal-Or (1987), Green
and Sadanand (1987), Nickerson and Sadanand (1990) and Robson (1990).
Observations ofexchange rate volatility offer an opportunity to apply the insights about irre-
versibility and commitment from the studies cited above to questions about the influence ofmarket
structure on the pattern of international production and trade. An explicit demonstration of the
analogy between irreversible investments in a nonstrategic context and the optimal exercising of
financial options first appears in Pindyck (1987), and a particularly important application of finan-
cial option-pricing techniques to the question of entry and exit by purely competitive firms under
exchange rate uncertainty appears in Dixit (1988). Dixit examines the optimal exercise, by foreign
firms operating under an infinite horizon, of the option to enter or exit a domestic industry by
incurring a sunk cost. Exchange rate uncertainty evolves according to geometric Brownian motion
and the option to enter or exit the domestic industry can be exercised only by incurring an ab-
stract fixed cost. The first paper to explore the option value of foreign investment under exchange
rate uncertainty in a strategic context is Nickerson and Sadanand (1989), who, in response to the
question posed by Dixit concerning the implications of imperfect competition for his results, ex-
amine the emergence of endogenous Stackelberg leadership under simultaneous cost and demand
uncertainty in a two- period model in which exchange rate volatility may prompt a foreign firm to
exercise its option to produce in a domestic market. A related paper is by Khoury and Nickerson
(1989), who examine the effects of precommitment under exchange rate variability on the pricing
and production decisions undertaken by firms in a homogeneous-commodity oligopoly.
The current paper differs from these earlier papers on multinational production and on strate-
gic domestic precommitment, in allowing firms to be initially symmetric and risk-neutral, and in
5considering the role that the purely strategic implications created by the endogenous timing of si-
multaneous production location and volume decisions by domestic firms operating under exchange
rate uncertainty has on the emergence of multinational production.
The paper is organized as follows. The essential features ofour model ofsymmetric duopoly are
discussed in Section II. Asymmetric market equilibria, induced by the assumption that exogenous
asymmetries distinguish firms and used as a benchmark against which to compare our symmetric
equilibrium, are analyzed in Section III. Sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies for our sym-
metric, risk-neutral duopolists is described in Section IV. Concluding remarks appear in the final
section.
II. A Model of Duopoly
We consider a model of production decisions undertaken by risk—neutral duopolists who exclu-
sively sell a nondurable good in their common domestic market under certain consumer demand
and who may produce this good either domestically or abroad. 2 Such firms have two aspects to
their production decisions. They must decide on the volume of production they wish to sell to do-
mestic consumers and they must also choose a domestic or foreign location for their production. ~
The option to produce the commodity abroad can be exercised, for each ofthese firms, by incurring
a certain plant—specific cost C. ‘~ This expenditure, which is analogous to the exercise price of a
financial option, represents the general fixed costs of activating a foreign plant for production. The
presence of such a cost allows, as in Helpman (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and Dixit
(1988), for the potential existence of plant-specific scale economies, which the firm must balance
against potential reductions in the marginal costs of foreign production created by a randomly
fluctuating exchange rate.
2 Since our analysis examines the potential influence of multinational production on domestic market structure, we refrain
from explicit consideration of the symmetric problem of domestic (foreign) multinationals serving a foreign (domestic)
market through the creation of a local subsidiary. Our results will also, however, apply identically to that case. We also
assume,following Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), Horstmann andMarkusen (1987) and others, theimplicit existence of
firm—specificsunk costs, representing the value of activities internal to the established firm, such as research, management
and marketing. Such sunk costs allow us to distinguish between a firm and its plants, and, in order to retain our focus
on the strategic behavior of incumbent duopolists, are assumed to of a magnitude sufficient to preclude entry into the
domestic market by new firms.
~ Although firms are, in general, free to share production intended for domestic sale between domestic and foreign plants,
the presence in our model of constant marginal production costs implies that each firm will optimally produce at only
one plant. This assumption, traditional in the literature on multinational firms, allows us to clearly exposit the purely
strategic aspects offoreign production sourcing and can readily be relaxed without qualifying any of our results.
~ The analogous expenditure for maintaining the domestic plant is, following Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and others,
assumed to have already been incurred by each ofthe domestic firms or, alternatively, to be negligible relative to the cost
G ofinvesting in the foreign plant.
6The fixed cost C of activating a foreign plant for production also, however, has strategic signifi-
cance in our model, because it allows the firm which incurs it to credibly precommit to an aggressive
production and sales strategy in the domestic market. ~ The strategic value of such a precom-
mitment depends crucially on its credibility, as perceived by the rival firm, since only a credible
precommitment will influence the production and sales strategy adopted by this rival. Credibil-
ity requires any ex ante decision to incur a cost of producing abroad to be an irreversible action.
A firm, consequently, may choose to sign binding contracts to make its precommitment credible,
which, in the context of our model, involves making an irreversible investment C to activate the
foreign plant under exchange rate uncertainty. 6
The real exchange rate e is assumed to be the unique source of uncertainty facing firms in
our duopoly. “ The stochastic value of this exchange rate which is relevant for current production
decisions is revealed exogenously at a certain time. Periods 1 and 2 respectively refer to the periods
before and after the common observation of the realization of the exchange rate. The timing of
this revelation allows for the existence of two distinct periods enabling firms to precomrnit to a
volume and location of production. ~ The costs of domestic production, as well as the magnitude
of domestic demand, are assumed to be deterministic and common knowledge between the firms.
Domestic production and domestic sales are, consequently, done under full certainty. ~
~W eassume that the only extant source ofuncertainty faced by firms in our model is real exchange rate uncertainty and,
consequently, the only precommitment device available to these firms is the option each holds to produce abroad. This
assumption is made because real exchange rate fluctuations are the purest theoretical example of relative price changes
and also because, for many American and Canadian firms, real exchange rate volatility was the predominant source of
uncertainty during the last several years.
6 A rec6nt case of multinational corporate behavior whichis entirely compatible with such a strategic interpretation is that
ofFord Motor Company, whichhas recently engaged in extensive and irreversible commitments to the foreign sourcing of
production components and which, most remarkably, precommited to binding design and engineering contracts with the
Japanese automaker Mazda in the development of the new Ford Escort model. Details of this episode appear in ~freece
and Borrus (1990).
~ Although no real distinction between the real and nominal exchange rates is necessarily implied by our model, this
distinction is empirically useful when applying our theoretical results to the analysis of real corporate behavior. We are
grateful to areferee for alsopointing out that the value ofincurring the cost G ofexercising the option to produce abroad
should be measured with respect to real exchange rate uncertainty, and that fluctuations in the real rate have a greater
tendency toward mean-reversionthan do nominal exchange rate fluctuations. See Coughlin andKoedijk (1990) andMeese
and Rogoff (1988) for evidence regarding this latter point.
8 While games of a finite number of periods, such as the one analyzed in this paper and those commonly employed in
the study of industrial organization, allow us to explicitly consider the role of uncertainty in a strategic context, the
compression ofinfinite planning horizons and continuous price or cost uncertainty into an essentially static structure is a
liabilityofsuchmodels. The exogenous resolution ofexchange rate randomness, for the purposes oftheproduction decision
in our model, requires us to interpret theproduction decision of our firms as a short-run decision, or alternatively, if we
view the fixed cost G of foreign production as an irreversible long-run investment, requires us to interpret theuncertainty
in the exchange rate as being relative to some expected long- run average, since the ex ante periods~,ofinvestment in real
plants can be of a year or more in duration.
° While we assume that only foreign production is subject to random cost, when measured in domestic units, in order to
emphasize the strategic opportunity afforded firms by exchange rate uncertainty, the essence of-our results will remain
robust to the inclusion of uncertainty in domestic demand orcost aslong asthe variance fromthese sources of randomness
are small relative to that provided by the real exchange rate.
7Since exchange rate uncertainty offers strategic opportunities to each of the domestic duopolists,
optimal corporate behavior depends crucially upon the timing of production location and volume
decisions. A firm can either precommit itself, through incurring the fixed investment cost C, to
a desired production volume abroad before exchange rate uncertainty is resolved or, alternatively,
it can remain flexible, making its production location and volume decisions after the uncertainty
relevant for current production costs is resolved. Precommitment is, as a result, credible only when
a foreign production level is chosen under uncertainty.
Each alternative strategy, precornmitment or the retention offlexibility, has benefits and costs.
By irreversibly precornrnitting in the first period to a foreign location for production, a firm suffers
cost uncertainty but, because precommitment involves choosing both a location and a volume of
production, the firm may obtain the advantage of potentially more profitable Stackelberg leadership
in the domestic market ifthe rival firm delays its production decisions until the second period, after
the relevant value of the exchange rate is realized and its implications for the marginal costs of
foreign production, denominated in domestic units, are observed by both firms. By remaining
flexible and delaying its production decisions until period 2, a firm does not have to face exchange
rate uncertainty but will necessarily acquiesce to being a potentially less profitable Stackelberg
follower in the domestic product market if the rival firm has, in the first period, precommited itself
to foreign production. After the revelation of the value of the exchange rate in period 2, a firm
that has not previously precommitted itself to foreign production will, of course, simply choose to
produce where it is cheaper.
The firms in this duopoly, as a consequence of the benefits and costs associated with precom-
mitment and with flexibility, can be regarded as playing a noncooperative game of timing in which
each firm has to decide “location timings” as well as the optimal associated volumes of production.
Firms that make their decisions about where to locate at the same time, whether this occurs under
exchange rate uncertainty in the first period or after the resolution ofthis uncertainty in the second
period, realize that the simultaneity of their decisions will create a Cournot equilibrium in sales in
the second period. Alternatively, if one firm decides to commit to foreign production in the first
period but the rival firm chooses to delay its location decision, then the precomnmnited firm will act
as a Stackelberg leader, producing and selling the volume of output corresponding to this status,
while the flexible firm will, believing its rival’s commitment to leadership status to be credible,
necessarily wish to act as a Stackelberg follower in regard to the volume of its production and sales.
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While the expenditure C required to activate a foreign plant must be incurred in the first
period in order for a firm to credibly precommit, it should be noted that actual production and sales
occur only during the second period. Precommitment to foreign production through foreign plant
activation in the first period, therefore, is analogous to entry decisions in industrial organization
models of stochastic oligopolies. Firms failing to exercise their option to activate a foreign plant in
the first period will produce abroad or domestically, whichever is cheapest, in the second period.
Three possible structures for the domestic industry could, consequently, endogenously emerge as
a result of the influence of exchange rate uncertainty on each firm’s strategic behavior. If neither
of the firms precommits in the first period to foreign production, then both firms participate in a
Cournot equilibrium in the domestic market in the second period, and make production location
and volume decisions based on the realized value ofthe exchange rate. If one firm precommits in the
first period to foreign production while the other firm remains flexible and waits for the exchange
rateto be revealed, then the precommitted firm will be a Stackelberg leader in the output game and
the other firm will be a follower. The follower firm may or may not produce abroad, depending on
the realization of the exchange rate, and we can have foreign and domestic production coexisting,
among initially symmetric firms, in the industry equilibrium. Finally, if both firms choose to
precommit in the first period to foreign production, the industry is again in a Cournot equilibrium.
One of the primary implications of our analysis, then, will be that multinational firms and
foreign production in equilibrium do not only arise because of exogenously assumed asymmetries
among firms, such as the incumbent—entrant relationship between an established domestic firm and
a potential foreign rival analyzed by Markusen (1984), Helpman (1984), Horstmann and Markusen
(1987), Kogut and Kulatilka (1989) and others; nor does their existence necessarily rely on risk
aversion and a desire to hedge against the nondiversifiable risk posed by a random real exchange
rate, as discussed in Hodder and Jucker (1985) and in Shapiro (1987). Multinational firms and the
foreign sourcing of production can endogenously arise among initially identical firms, owing only to
the pure leadership advantage ofprecommitment under uncertainty. This isa unique explanation of
the relationship between exchange rate volatility and multinational production, and serves to both
10 The role of uncertainty in creating this tradeoff between precommitment and flexibility between e~ante symmetric firms
can be clarified by considering what each such firm would wish to do if no exchange rate uncertainty existed. Since firms
are identical, neither firm would wish to be a Stackelberg follower. Stackelberg leadership, however, is also precluded as
a Nash equilibrium, since neither firm could credibly convince its rival of a commitment to produce a quantity sufficient
to establish industry leadership. Underthese conditions precommitment cannot occur between symmetric firms and such
firms would knowingly participate in a Cournot equilibrium in production and domestic sales.
9link market structure to multinational production through the strategic opportunities offered by a
fluctuating exchange rate, and to establish a robust correlation between multinational production
and industry leadership. ‘~
Assumptions about technology and consumer preferences in our model of duopoly are chosenfor
expositional simplicity. 12 Each of the two domestic duopolists enjoys common, deterministic and
constant marginal costs C when production occurs at a domestic plant. The aggregate preferences
of domestic consumers are assumed to be described by a linear inverse demand surface with a
price intercept of A and a slope of —1. Such preferences are also assumed to satisfy the inequality
A — C > 0 since, otherwise, neither firm will engage in any production. Production costs for each
firm are the same domestically and are the same abroad, in the common location of (potential)
foreign production, in the sense that identical factor prices obtain for each firm and each firm
shares the same technology as its rival at home and abroad. While relaxing this assumption of
symmetry does not alter the qualitative nature of the results, such symmetry makes our results
more interesting because now firms may choose different production locations for purely strategic
reasons.
Due to the real rate of exchange e between foreign and domestic units of measurement, the
marginal cost of foreign production is denoted by 0 in domestic units and the exchange rate is
defined by e = 0/C. Since C is deterministic and is common knowledge between the firms, 0 is
regarded by the firms as stochastic and the magnitude of the difference between marginal costs of
production at a domestic plant and at a foreign plant, measured in domestic units, is the unique
common source of uncertainty faced by each firm. 0 could, if desired, be measured as inclusive of
constant and deterministic unit transportation costs or tariffs, incurred in shipping the commodity
to the domestic market.
Domestic costs and demand are common knowledge, and the firms are also assumed to have
identical beliefs about the distribution of 0. Again, while differences in initial beliefs about the
~ While our explanation of the influence of exchange rate uncertainty is unique in its demonstration of multinational pro-
duction amongsymmetric firms, it can be viewed as being complementary to the traditional explanations of multinational
production among asymmetric firms described above. It also establishes a direct linkage between anticipated real ex-
change rate volatility and the volume of direct foreign investment which does not depend, as do the explanations of this
phenomenon advanced by Shapiro (1987), Hodder and Jucker (1985), and others, on implicit assumptions about capital
market imperfections which must be invoked to justify risk-averse corporate behavior.
12 Selection of linear demand and constant marginal costs is made strictly for expositional convenienc. While it is straight-
forward but mathematically tedious to prove propositions analogous to those appearing in the text in a more general
context of cost and demand, assuming only continuous differentiability and compactness where required, no new insights
are obtained by so doing and potential advantages of this generality for empirical implementation are, in our opinion,
modest. The interested reader can refer to Nickerson and Sadanand (1989) fora discussion ofthese analogous propositions
in a more general model.
10distribution of 0 do not change the nature of the results, our results are made more striking by the
assumption that the firms have identical beliefs about exchange rate uncertainty. Firm are also
assumed to behave as if they were risk- neutral and, consequently, do not engage in direct foreign
investment or production for the purposes of hedging real exchange rate risk.
The strategy of each firm i consists, in period 1, of a probability, denoted by v~,that firm i will
incur the fixed cost C of foreign plant activation in that period, and the corresponding quantity,
denoted by x11, that firm i will announce in period 1 that it has credibly precommited to produce
abroad in period 2, conditional on its expenditure of C. If firm i wishes to remain flexible and
defer, with probability one, its decision on a production location until exchange rate uncertainty is
resolved, v~and x~will each be zero, and, inthis case, x~will denote the production volume of firm
i in period 2, where r = d corresponds to production at the domestic plant and r = f corresponds
to production at a foreign plant. ~ denotes the expectation operator over the distribution of 8
and C denotes the fixed cost to each firm of activating a foreign plant to produce for the domestic
market. Market equilibria are derived using the concept of sequential equilibrium. ~
III. Equilibria in an Asymmetric Duopoly
As a useful benchmark against which to compare our later equilibrium among symmetric firms,
we will first illustrate an obvious but important point: if strategic interaction in the domestic
product market is not allowed to affect the choice of production location by firms, then the location
selected by each firm has no strategic value and depends solely on the realized value ofthe exchange
rate e and the fixed cost C of activating the foreign plant. We can obtain coexistence offoreign and
domestic production in this artificial case only by a specification of the sales game in the domestic
product market in which differential production locations are driven by the exogenous presence of
some ad hoc form of asymmetry between firms. We will then show, in Section IV below, that in
our general game, different production locations emerge endogenously as a result of the interaction
between the timing ofthe choice ofproduction location by each firm and its strategic behavior in the
domestic product market, even though our firms are strategically and informationally symmetric.
Suppose first that firms are exogenously specified to play a Cournot game in outputs. Output
and production timing decisions are made separately. Since the firms have no strategic advantage
to precommitment in period 1, it is a dominant strategy for both firms to defer production decision
13 See Kreps and Wilson (1982) for the original discussion ofthis equilibrium concept for dynamic games.
11until period 2. Since the firms are symmetric, in the symmetric Cournot equilibrium their outputs
will be identical. This implies that the decision to produce will also be identical. It is easy to
see that if the firms choose foreign production, then each firm’s output will be (A — 0)/3, and if
they produce domestically, each firm’s output will be (A — C)/3. Production takes place abroad
in period 2 whenever the profits from doing so are at least as large as the profits from domestic
production. A sufficient condition for this to occur, taking into account the non-negativity ofprofits
under either production location, is
29(A0) _2C(~C) >2A0—2AC+C2—82+C.
Consequently, both firms will produce abroad whenever the realization of 8 is less than the positive
zero of the quadratic 02 —4A0+(4AC—C2 —3C), and both firms will produce domestically otherwise.
Regardless of the realization of 0, however, the symmetry between firms and the exogenously
imposed separation of any strategic interaction between the timing of the choice of production
location and firm behavior in the product market guarantee that precommitment to a foreign
production location under exchange rate uncertainty has no value and that rival firms will not
endogenously select different production locations. On the other hand, we can induce rival firms to
select different production locations in equilibrium, but only if we introduce an ad hoc asymmetry
between the rival firms, while keeping production volume and location timing decisions separate,
by exogenously specifying aaStackelberg game in the domestic product market. Allow one firm to
produce abroad first with probability one and require the second firm to remain flexible and delay
its choice of production location until period 2, when exchange rate uncertainty is resolved. It is
clear that once 0 is revealed, the firm that has delayed will decide whether or not to produce abroad
by comparing the relative magnitudes of the fixed cost C and the relative change in marginal costs,
0 — C. This behavior will, in turn, affect the ex ante behavior of the first firm in period 1. Optimal
behavior for the follower firm in this case, which is similar to the Cournot behavior it exhibits in
the equilibrium above, is described by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Given that one firm has decided to produce abroad in period 1, the decision
rule for the follower firm is as follows: For sufficiently small C and for some 0~S~ C foreign
production will occur if and only if 0 < 6.
Proof. Let x1 denote, in this example, the output of the firm that has decided to produce abroad
first, i.e., the exogenously specified Stackelberg leader. Then, if he were to produce abroad, the
12follower would choose an output
/ A—x1—0
2 (1)




The leader firm’s output x1 will depend upon whether the follower firm has reaction function (1) or
reaction function (2). Let ‘y be the probability perceived by the leader that the follower produces
abroad under this Stackelberg specification. 14 The leader’s optimal behavior is described as the
solution to:
max~{ ((A_xi — A—x1 —8 —0)xi _C)~+ (1_~)((A_xi — A—x1 —C —8)x1
Consequently,
= ~. ~(0) — -~‘. C +C+A — ~(0) (3)
Now, the follower’s profit when it produces abroad is
= (A —— 0)2 — C (4)
and its profit when it produces domestically is
d(A-xi-C) (5)
so, the follower firm produces abroad whenever
A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is
2x18—2x1C>2A~8—2A.C+C2—02+C. (6)
Substituting for x1 from (3) above, and since for values of 0 which imply foreign production ~y= 1,
from condition (6) we see that all production takes place abroad if and only if 0 is less than the
positive zero of the quadratic 82 + 8(A + cJ (0)) — (3AC — C2
— C~(0) — C).
0
14 Since these are subjective probabilities, and since the follower will never adopt a mixed strategy in this situation, we
assume zero covariancebetween the leader’s subjective forecast of -i and the random exchange rate e.
13As long as the foreign marginal costs in domestic currency and the fixed cost of foreign plant
activation are sufficiently low, the follower firm will produce abroad. Multinational production
is cost driven, rather than being strategy driven, in this case, and the possibility of differential
production locations arises here only as a result of the exogenous imposition of an asymmetric
Stackelberg equilibrium in the domestic product market.
IV. Equilibrium in the Symmetric Duopoly
The endogenous emergence ofmultinational firms and foreign sourcing of production, as a direct
response to the opportunity that exchange rate uncertainty creates for risk-neutral symmetric firms,
will exist only when interaction between strategic behavior in the product market and the timing
of each firm’s production decisions is allowed to occur. Allowing this interaction to appear in an
oligopolistic model of investment and production seems highly realistic, since most real business
firms appear to be fully aware of their desired production and sales volumes prior to undertaking
fixed investments, such as the creation or activation of a foreign plant.
We show below, as argued in Section II, that when symmetric, risk- neutral firms are allowed
to make decisions concerning the volume and location of production simultaneously, and can choose
to make these decisions either before or after the resolution of exchange rate uncertainty, a multina-
tional firm will endogenously emerge and act as the Stackelberg leader in its industry. The strategy
pursued by each firm i in the first period consists of announcing both v~and x1.
This is illustrated by an example of the extensive form of this game, as described in Section II,
which appears in Figure 1. This example represents a case in which the support of the distributions
of e and, consequently, 8, consist of two points. During the first stage of the game, which is
illustrated in Figure 1, firms have the option, under uncertainty about the exchange rate, to either
precommit (P) to foreign production, or remain flexible (F) to decide on a production location
after the resolution of exchange rate uncertainty. Selection of the option to precommit in this first
stage will also simultaneously involve a first-stage announcement of a volume of production to be
undertaken in the second stage. Figure 1 depicts, for each firm, two such actions, each involving
both a precommitment (P) to foreign production and an implicit quantity which will be produced
in the second period. ~s Contingent on the first-stage choices described in Figui’e 1, second-stage
Cournot or Stackelberg behavior by the firms in the domestic product market is then determined.
~ Since the volume ofproduction is a continuous variable, there are implicitly a continuum ofsuch branches in Figure 1.
14Insert Figure 1 here
A unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies of the timing of the production
decision, v~,and in pure strategies for the volume of production to be announced in the first
period, x11, exists for this game. Firms in this symmetric equilibrium play a completely mixed
strategy in production timing and pure strategies in output levels x~1.Precommitment to foreign
production occurs with a certain probability strictly between zero and one, while the volume of
production, to which firms may precommit in the first period with this probability, is deterministic.
This symmetric sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies also exists under more general as-
sumptions regarding the distributions of e and 8, as shown by the following proposition:
Proposition 2. A unique symmetric sequential Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, describing
the timing ofeachfirm’sproduction decisions, willexist for the strategic model ofproduction under
exchange rate uncertainty for any distribution of the real exchange rate e.
Proof. The method of proof involves derivation of the optimal volume of production to which
a firm would optimally precommit under exchange rate uncertainty. If this volume of production
is positive, substitution of this quantity into a condition expressing an equivalence between the
expected value of becoming a Stackelberg leader in the product market, through precommitment
toforeign production, and the expected valueof remaining flexible and delaying decisions concerning
production until period 2, generates the mixed strategy equilibrium. This equilibrium is expressed
in terms of a value of v~for each firm i which lies in the strictly open unit interval.
In a symmetric sequential equilibrium, the optimal volume of production to which each firm i
would optimally precommit in period 1, x~1,solves the problem:




+ (1 — c) ((A ——— O)x~1
— C) }]. (7)
where v5 is the probability that the rival firmj will also precommit to foreign production in period 1
and where c is the probability that the rival firm, should it remain flexible, decides, in period 2, to
produce abroad. 16 Equation (7) is the ex anteexpected profit of precommitted foreign production,
ie Note that this latter probability, e, is, in general, different from the analogous probability y appearing in equation (3)
because the firms are in a different equilibrium.
15conditional on the perceived belief by firm i that the rival firmj will simultaneously precommit to
foreign production in period 1 with probability u3, while in period 2 the rival firm, should it not so
precommit, may choose either domestic or foreign production after the revelation of the value of
the exchange rate. Equation (7) exactly reflects the imperfect information embedded in the game
and also makes the firms strategically and informationally symmetric.
If firms i andj are infact identical, then the generalized mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium
reflected in equation (7) must also satisfy the following symmetry conditions:









(e) The ex ante expected profit of precommiting to foreign production in period 1 is equal to the
ex ante expected profit of remaining flexible and deferring the production location and volume
decisions until period 2.
The above conditions imply that, in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the optimal
volume of production under a precommitment to a foreign location for production in period 1 must
satisfy:
x - x - 0)x - C] + (1- v)[c((A- x - - 0)x - C)
+ (1- c)((A - x - x~ - 0)x - C)]]
= ~ - x - x~- O)x~- C) + (1- e) ((A - x -- C)x~)]
+ (1- v)[c((A --- 0)x~- C) + (1- c)((A - - - C)x~)}] (8)
Solving for the symmetric volume of production x under first period precomnmitment in the
maximization problem (7), using conditions (a) and (b) above, we obtain:
— (1—c)(1—v)(C—~(0))+(1+v)(A—~(0)) ~, 9
3(1+v)
Substituting for x from equation (9) into condition (8) above we obtain a third degree polynomial in
v, the symmetric probability of first period precommitment to foreign production, with a constant
16term, which is a function of C, A, e and ~(0). The real—valued zero of this polynomial gives us a
generalized mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium.
0
Proposition 2 demonstrates that multinational firms may arise because randomness in the
exchange rate offers symmetric firms the strategic opportunity to emerge as industry leaders. Ge-
ographical dispersion in production is a mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium whenever the fixed
costs of foreign production are sufficiently small and there is a potential leadership advantage to
precommitted foreign production. Most importantly, this dispersion is, in our model, truly endoge-
nous, with strategically symmetric firms facing identical costs and holding identical ex ante beliefs
about the distribution of exchange rate fluctuations. -
The intuition underlying the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium described in Proposition
2 involves the timing of the production location decision undertaken by each firm, as well as the
recognition that each firm rationally perceives that exchange rate uncertainty offers a unique but
costly chance to credibly precommit to that volume of production which would enable it to emerge
as a potentially profitable Stackelberg leader. First, note that the randomization in the strategy
of each firm i is in the timing of the decisions concerning the location of its production and not
in the volume x~1of production itself. Decisions concerning the optimal volume of production
reflect the outcome of accurately anticipated Cournot or Stackelberg equilibria in the domestic
product market, resulting in the adoption by each firm of a pure strategy in the desired quantity of
production. The probability zi~adopted by each firm I as part of its mixed strategy in the timing of
the production location decision, however, changes the expected gain of being a Stackelberg leader
in the product market. Since firms make production location and volume decisions simultaneously,
a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium will ensue if each risk-neutral firm rationally perceives
an equality to obtain between the expected value of precommiting to foreign production under
exchange rate uncertainty and the value of retaining flexibility by delaying its location and volume
decision until after the resolution of such uncertainty. This equatity is expressed by equation (8).
Four specific implications for the relations between exchange rate volatility, the existence of
multinational firms and the endogenous emergence of industry leadership through a strategic com-
mitment to the foreign sourcing of production are immediate from equations (8) and (9). First, in
the above polynomial, because of the constant term, v = 0 is not a solution, for sufficiently small
17C. 17 This means that a situation in which both firms choose to remain flexible and defer their
production decisions until period 2, with probability one, cannot be an equilibrium. Consequently,
even though there is a chance that the exchange rate may make foreign production unprofitable ex
post, there is a positive probability that one firm may choose to become a multinational and invest
in the activation of a foreign plant in period 1. This occurs, not because of an asymmetry between
firms or because of some implicit imperfection in capital markets which drives risk-averse firms
to hedge against real exchange risk through diversification of production locations, but precisely
because there is a leadership advantage to precommitment, even if firms are entirely risk-neutral,
and this advantage should clearly not be offset by C, the fixed cost ofinvesting in a foreign plant. 18
Even approaching the limit, when 0 is known almost surely to be equal to C, and when therefore
c will approach zero for any positive value of C, x.’ = 0 cannot be a solution to the polynomial
generated by equations (8) and (9). 19
Second, as long as there is some uncertainty that foreign production, under the realized value
of foreign marginal production cost 0, may not be profitable, V = 1 isnot a zero of the polynomial.
Consequently, both firms choosing foreign production in period 1 with probability one is also not an
equilibrium. Precommited multinational production with probability one by both firms will result,
as both firms rationally anticipate, in a Cournot equilibrium in the domestic product market.
This, of course, cannot be a Nash equilibrium with timing as strategies, since given that one firm
is producing a Cournot quantity in period 1 with probability one, the other firm knows that it is
better off choosing Cournot outputs in the second period after the random value of the exchange
rate e is revealed, as long as there is some chance that 9 may not be profitable.
Third, the quantity of production in period 2 to which either firm would optimally precommit
in period i, x, may, from equation (9), be seen to be a linearly increasing function of the optimal
expected quantity the firm would produce in a simple Cournot equilibrium, (A — ~(8))/3. The
quantity x, which corresponds to the expected value of the quantity which would be produced
by a Stackelberg leader in the domestic product market, may also be seen to be increasing in






18 Although we concentrate our analysis solely on the symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, Njckerson and Sadanand
(1989) show that, in a related model and under certain parametric assumptions on costs and the distribution of 0, an
asymmetric market equilibrium may exist in pure strategies, with one of the duopolists committing with probability one
to foreign production, and the rival firm acquiesing to its status as afollower in the domestic market with probability one.
19 In fact, under those circumstances, the outcome of a mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium will be a simple Stackelberg
equilibrium.
18firm also precommitting to foreign production in period 1, and decreasing in ~(0), the expected
value of marginal unit production costs at a foreign plant. These results all accord well with our
intuition of the firm’s optimal strategy in the domestic market: having decided to precornmit to
foreign production, the firm wishes to produce more as the expected difference between foreign and
domestic marginal costs increases and as the probability that the rival firm will also precommit in
the first period decreases.
Finally, the decision to engage in multinational production, even with risk-neutral firms, will
in general depend, as illustrated by the dependence of the quantity x on the probability V of
precommitment in equation (9), on higher-order moments of the distribution of the exchange rate,
as well as on its mean. Equations (8) and (9) imply, for example, that, in a symmetric equilibrium,
both firms will randomize their production between domestic and foreign locations for finite values
of the variance of the exchange rate, but that the probability of precommitment to multinational
production can decline to zero for the limiting values, zero and infinity, of the variance of the
exchange rate. 20 This implies that, for a sufficiently large variance in the exchange rate, the
potential benefits of precommitment are dominated by the advantages of flexibility and both firms
will choose domestic production. Alternatively, when exchange rate variance is zero, the value of
precommitment disappears and both firms engage in a Cournot behavior under certainty, choosing
to produce in the cheapest location.
V. Concluding Remarks
Conventional wisdom in both the academic literature and the business press explains corporate
decisions to become multinational and to engage in foreign production sourcing for domestic sales
as being motivated by one of two reasons. The first reason depends largely, if not entirely, on
asymmetries which are assumed to exogenously distinguish firms. These asymmetries are especially
assumed to exist in regard to intangible, firm-specific assets, such as management and marketing
skills and the returns to previous expenditures on research and development, and also on such factors
as expectations concerning firm-specific opportunities for lower foreign production costs, due to
differential beliefs about the permanency of exchange rate movements or impending changes in trade
barriers, or access by some firms to foreign subsidies for investment abroad, or differential access
by firms to domestic and foreign capital markets. The second reason rationalizes the diversification
20 Derivation ofthis relationship in (8) and (9) is straightforward but tedious, and is left for the interested reader.
19of production locations among nations as a means that risk-averse firms might use to hedge against
real exchange rate risk. This explanation would be plausible if, for example, domestic equityholders
cannot fully diversify their individual portfolios, so that corporations provide some intermediation
services, international capital markets cannot be used to sufficiently hedge against exchange rate
risk, and the return to hedging through foreign sourcing of production exceeds the potentially
substantial fixed costs of investment in foreign plants.
This paper offers a new explanation of the endogenous emergence of multinational produc-
tion, one that relies neither on assumptions about exogenous asymmetries between firms nor on
assumptions about corporate risk aversion and imperfections in capital markets. The model of
multinational production in this paper treats the decisions about where to produce and how much
to produce as an inextricably linked equilibrium outcome of a purely strategic situation where
identical risk-neutral firms evaluate the costs and benefits of the trade-off between precommitted
foreign production under exchange rate uncertainty with market leadership on one hand, and the
flexibility generated by temporarily deferring production decisions in order to obtain better infor-
mation about the exchange rate and cost conditions relevant for current production, but possibly
at the cost of being an industry follower, on the other.
The primary result of our paper is that multinational firms may arise for the purely strategic
reasons of potentially profitable industry leadership which are created by random fluctuations in
the exchange rate. Specifically, in a duopoly with identical firms and first-period uncertainty about
the real exchange rate, there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium which may result in a geo-
graphical dispersion of production. Under this equilibrium, foreign production may endogenously
be undertaken by some firms and not others, solely due to the leadership advantages associated
with precommitment to foreign production under exchange rate uncertainty. The nature of this
equilibrium implies that the probability of precommitment to foreign production is strictly bounded
between zero and one, for positive finite values of exchange rate variance, with the simultaneous
selection of either domestic or foreign production by both firms being precluded as equilibrium out-
comes. These results provide an explicit link between real exchange rate volatility, market structure
and multinational production, and imply that, for purely strategic reasons, dominant or leading
firms in an industry may be naturally multinational.
These results must, however, be interpreted in the context of our model, which was designed
to exposit the intuition of strategic production opportunities under exchange rate uncertainty but
20is necessarily focused solely on the behavior of domestic duopolists. Desirable refinements to our
model include the following extensions. First, in the current model, precommitment is tantamount
to foreign production. We can relax this assumption by allowing firms to make simultaneously three
decisions: quantity of output, timing of output and production location. Assuming both foreign and
domestic plants require fixed investment expenditures in this case, this extension will not alter our
results, since a mixed strategy equilibrium in the timing of production location decisions will still
occur. It would, however, more fully depict the strategic options available to many domestic firms.
Second, we have followed the traditional literature on multinational firms by implicitly assuming
the presence of firm-specific, as well as plant-specific, fixed costs. These firm-specific costs can
preclude foreign firms from simultaneoulsy entering the domestic market, as discussed in Nickerson
and Sadanand (1989), as well as the possibility of domestic and foreign firms producing and selling
in both domestic and foreign markets. The inclusion of these features would enhance the realism of
our model, as well its complexity. Third, we can allow domestic firms to confront multiple sources
of uncertainty, each of which would offer them a strategic opportunity for precommitment. Finally,
we need not have a complete resolution of exchange rate uncertainty, but rather we can model
periods of decreasing and increasing uncertainty in this rate.
The primary point we wish to emphasize in this paper is that exchange rate volatility offers a
purely strategic explanation for the endogenous emergence ofindustry leadership andmultinational
production among initially symmetric risk-neutral firms. Our model provides an interesting and
important example of this.
21Rest of the game
is Stackelberg
with firm 1 as
leader. Follower’s
cost is C or 8
depending upon
whether it does not
or does produce
abroad in the second
period -
Rest of the game
is Stackelberg
with firm 2 as
leader. Follower’s
cost is Co r8
depending upon
whether it does not
or does produce
abroad in the second
period.
4
Rest of the game
is Cournot with
symmetric costs




in the second period.
Notes:
1. This is a sample extensive form game with two realizations of
the random exchange rate 8/C. Similar looking paths have
not all been drawn. Dashed lines denote information sets.
2. “P” denotes “Precommit to foreign production” and “F” denotes
“Remain flexible to decide production after resolution of
uncertainty.”
3. If a firm chooses to produce abroad then it has to choose its
output level depicted by any one line under the heading “F”.
One line or branch will exist for each of the possible levels
of production to which a firm could credibly precommit under
exchange rate uncertainty, although we depict only two such
lines for each firm.
~. The players are ~, ~and ~ = nature.
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